Abstract-In this paper, we propose an efficient security scheme for position-based routing (ESPR) in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). The ESPR scheme considers both digital signature and keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), where the key used in calculating the HMAC is shared only between unrevoked On-Board Units (OBUs). In addition, the ESPR scheme uses a novel probabilistic key distribution, which enables unrevoked OBUs to securely share and update a secret key. By conducting security analysis and performance evaluation, the ESPR scheme is demonstrated to outperform its counterparts in terms of communication overhead and delay while achieving robust and secure operation.
I. INTRODUCTION
VANET has gained extensive interest in academia and industry for its foreseeable wide range of safety and comfort applications. VANETs enable vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication by equipping vehicles with on-board units (OBUs) and installing roadside units (RSUs) along roads. VANET applications can be classified according to the encountered number of hops in vehicular communications to one-hop and multi-hop applications.
Routing is the key enabling mechanism for multi-hop applications in VANETs. Unfortunately, designing an efficient routing scheme for VANETs is very challenging due to the dynamic VANET topology caused by the high mobility of vehicles. Vehicular communication projects such as CarTalk2000 [1] and NoW [2] have considered position-based routing (PBR) to cope with the challenging VANET network characteristics. PBR depends on the availability of the geographic locations of vehicles, which is already known to all vehicles as VANETs require each vehicle to be equipped with GPS receiver to properly function in the network. In addition, PBR can adapt to the rapidly changing topology of VANET as it does not depend on a predetermined route to forward the packets from the source to the destination. Studies show that PBR performs well in urban and highway scenarios [3] .
Securing PBR operation is one of the basic requirements for robust multi-hop vehicular communications. Without security guarantee, an attacker can disrupt the network operation by launching a number of serious attacks, e.g., sinkhole attack, routing loop attack, sybil attack, etc. Entity authentication, message integrity, and end-to-end non-repudiation are identified as primary security requirements for secure routing in VANETs [4] .
To improve the PBR efficiency, some works [5] [6] focused on detecting falsified position information by employing additional hardware, e.g., radars and sensors. These works focused on verification the nodes' positions rather than considering a comprehensive scheme for securing PBR in VANETs. The most notable work that addressed securing PBR in VANETs is given in [7] . In this work, a hybrid signature scheme is proposed, where each node along the route verifies the digital signature and certificate of the source and the previous forwarder, and then, replaces the signature and certificate of the previous forwarder by its own. Adding the signature and certificate of each forwarder to the routed packets causes extra communication and computational overheads, which may limit the efficiency of this work.
Different from the above work, we propose an efficient security scheme for position-based routing (ESPR) featuring secure operation while minimizing the communication and computational overheads.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces preliminaries and the system model under consideration. The ESPR scheme is presented in section III. Security analysis and performance evaluation are given in section IV and section V, respectively. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES In this section, we discuss the PBR, security threats and requirements, hash chains, and system model under consideration.
A. Position Based Routing (PBR)
In general, PBR consists of the following components [7] :
• Beaconing: Each vehicle periodically broadcasts its geographic location and identity. Based on the received beacons, each vehicle maintains a table of the locations of its one-hop neighboring vehicles.
• Location service: Before a vehicle can send a message to another vehicle, it should determine the geographic location of the destination vehicle. This can be achieved through location queries and responses. The source vehicle broadcasts a location query including the last known identity of the destination, and waits until it receives a location response with the updated location of the destination. The details and the different approaches of the location service are orthogonal to the secure routing problem, and will not be discussed here. For interested readers, a survey of the different types of location services can be found in [8] .
• Message forwarding: The routing header of a packet in PBR should include the identity, timestamp, and position of the source, destination, and sender vehicles, where the source and destination are the end nodes, and the sender is the last intermediate packet-forwarder. PBR supports unicast and geocast message forwarding. Fig. 1 
The system model services. Then, the source vehicle, based on the stored location table for the neighboring vehicle, forwards the message to the next vehicle according to the routing protocol forwarding strategy. This process continues until the message reaches its destination.
B. Security Requirements
The fundamental requirements for securing PBR in VANETs are as follows:
• Entity authentication: Entity authentication is required to ensure that only legitimate nodes can communicate with each other.
• Data Integrity: Data integrity is a concern to ensure that the contents of the packets are not modified in transit.
• End-to-end non-repudiation: End-to-end non-repudiation is necessary to prevent legitimate end users, i.e., the source, from denying the transmission or the content of their messages. The role of an intermediate node in multi-hop communications is to forward packets to the next hop, and it does not modify the content of the message sent by the source node. Accordingly, the intermediate nodes cannot be held responsible for the contents of the message, and nonrepudiation is not required between intermediate nodes. It should be noted that we only consider outsider attackers, i.e., attackers who do not have any certificates or secret keys.
C. Hash Chains
A hash function is a computationally irreversible one-way function. A hash chain [9] successively applies a hash function (h) to an initial secret value v to produce chain of irreversible Fig. 2 .
D. System Model
As shown in Fig. 3 , the system model under consideration consists of the followings.
• A Trusted Authority (TA), which is responsible for providing certificates and distributing secret keys to all OBUs in the network; • Roadside Units (RSUs), which are fixed units distributed all over the network. The RSUs can communicate securely with the TA; Set v i = h(v i−1 ) 10: end for 11: for all OBU u in the network, TA do 12: for i ← 1, m do 13: Select a random number a ∈ [1, l] 14:
Upload the secret key k a ∈ KP in OBU u 15: end for 16: Generate a set of certificates with predetermined validity periods 17: Upload the set of certificates in OBU u 18: end for 19: Announce h and the TA's public key to all the OBUs
• On-Board Units (OBUs), which are embedded in vehicles.
OBUs can communicate either with other OBUs through V2V communications or with RSUs through V2I communications. Note that the system model is mainly a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system, where each OBU has a set of certificates, used to secure its communication, as well as a set of secret keys used for generating a shared secret key between all legitimate OBUs. Legitimate OBUs do not have sufficient incentives to disclose security materials, e.g., secret keys, certificates, etc., to the revoked OBUs. Finally, we consider that a compromised OBU is instantly detected by the TA. It should be noted that we use the words vehicle, node, and OBU interchangeably.
III. THE PROPOSED ESPR SCHEME The proposed ESPR scheme employs PKI for end-to-end security and HMAC, calculated using a secret key shared by unrevoked nodes, for securing communications between intermediate forwarders in multi-hop vehicular communications.
A. System Initialization
The TA initializes the system by executing Algorithm 1. After the system is initialized, the TA will have the followings: A secret key pool KP = {k i |1 ≤ i ≤ l}; the secret key K g ; a set of hash chain values V = {v i |0 ≤ i ≤ j}, where j is large enough to accommodate with the number of revocation processes occur during the life-time of the network; and the hash function h. In addition, each OBU u will have the followings: A set of certificates with predetermined validity periods used to achieve authentication; a set of secret keys R u consisting of m keys randomly selected from KP , i.e., R u ⊂ KP ; the secret key K g , which is shared between all the legitimate OBUs; the hash function h; and the TA's public key used to verify the certificate of any entity in the network.
B. Message Transmission and Reception
In ESPR, a vehicle can transmit/forward a message by executing Algorithm 2. It should be noted that in case of forwarding a message, only steps (16-20) are executed. When a vehicle receives a message, it executes Algorithm 3 to process the received 978-1-4244-5638-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 Crown Inset the vehicle's information in source and sender routing header's fields 3: if the message is beacon then 4: Insert the geographic coordinates of the one hop communication range in the destination field 5: else insert the destination location information extracted from the routing table in the destination field 6: end if 7: Append the source's certificate and a timestamp to the message 8: Sign the entire message using the secret key corresponding to the source's certificate 9: else i.e., multi-hop message 10: if the vehicle is the source of the message then 11: Get the destination's location via location service 12: Inset the source and destination information in the immutable routing header fields 13: Append the source's certificate and a timestamp 14: Sign the entire message except for the mutable fields using the secret key corresponding to the source's certificate 15: end if 16: Insert the information of the next forwarder and a timestamp in the mutable sender field in the routing header 17:
Calculate HMAC on the routing header using the shared secret key K g
18:
Append the HMAC to the message 19: end if 20: Send the message
C. Revocation
The revocation is triggered by the TA when there is an OBU u to be revoked. The certificates of OBU u must be revoked. In addition, the secret key set R u of OBU u and the secret key K g are considered revoked. Hence, a new secret key K g should be securely distributed to all the unrevoked OBUs. Also, each unrevoked OBU should securely update the compromised keys in its key sets R [10] [11] . The revocation process is as follows.
1) The TA searches its database to determine the identity (M ) of the non-compromised secret key k M that is shared by the majority of the unrevoked OBUs. The TA then selects the value v j−ver of the hash chain values, where v j is the last value in the hash chain as shown in Fig. 2 , and ver is an integer indicating the revocation version, i.e., the number of the revocation processes performed since the network initialization. After that the TA calculates the new secret key Verify the source's certificate and signature using the TA's and the source's public keys, respectively.
3:
if invalid then drop the message 4: else process the message 5: end if 6: else i.e., the vehicle is a forwarder 7: Calculate HMAC on the routing header using the shared secret key K g and compare it with the HMAC appended to the received message 8: if a mismatch occurs then drop the message 9:
else 10:
Repeat step (2) 11: if invalid then drop the message 12: else execute Algorithm 2 13: end if 14: end if 15: end if 2) After receiving the message REV msg , each OBU y executes Algorithm 4; 3) OBU y has to execute Algorithm 5 to get v j−ver and K g .
If OBU y has K M , it can independently get v j−ver and calculate K g according to step (3). Otherwise, OBU y gets v j−ver and K g from its neighboring OBUs as indicated in steps (5-13); 4) OBU y has to execute Algorithm 6 to update its key sets R y . In step (11), ver | missed and IDrev key| missed denote the revocation version and the list of identities of the revoked keys of a missed revocation process, respectively. It should be noted that ESPR enables an OBU to update its compromised keys even if it missed revocation processes provided that it will pick one revocation process in the future.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS In this section, we analyze the security of the ESPR scheme in terms of the achieved security services as well as its resistance to some common attacks.
1) Achieved security services:
In ESPR, end-to-end entity authentication and non-repudiation are achieved via verifying the source's certificate and signature appended to the message, respectively. In addition, authentication between intermediate forwarders is achieved via the possession of the secret key K g , shared only between unrevoked nodes, which is necessary for calculating the HMAC values on the routing header. It should be noted that beacons, which are one-hop messages, are digitally signed by their sources. Consequently, the routing table entries are nonrepudiable, and any implausible location included in the beacons can be reported to the TA for possible punishment.
In a one-hop message, the source signs the entire message. Consequently, any modification of the message content renders the included source's signature invalid, and hence, the recipients can easily detect that the packet is modified in transit. In multihop messages, the source signs the entire message except for the mutable fields, and a forwarder calculates HMAC using the group key K g on the routing header. Any modification to the message contents renders either the source's signature or the HMAC invalid. Accordingly, message integrity is achieved in both 978-1-4244-5638-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 Crown Decrypt enc kM (v j−ver ) using k M to get v j−ver 3:
Set the new secret key
Broadcast a request and cert OBUy (ID y , PK y ) to get v j−ver and K g from neighboring OBUs 6: Start a timer T 1
7:
Any neighboring OBU of OBU y having v j−ver uses the public key (PK y ) of OBU y , included in its certificate, to encrypt v j−ver ||K g and sends them to OBU y 8: if the encrypted v j−ver is received then 9: Decrypt v j−ver ||K g using the secret key corresponding to PK y to get v j−ver and K g 10:
if T 1 is timed out then Go to 5 12: end if 13: end if 14 Set n = ver 7: while n = v ver last do ver last is the last received revocation version 8:
Set n = ver + 1 10: end while this loop outputs
Broadcast a request to the neighboring OBUs requesting ver | missed and IDrev key| missed for all the missed revocation processes 12: for each received value of ver | missed do 13: Find the value of v j−ver | missed from
for each possessed key k i ∈ IDrev key| missed do 15: Update the secret key 
2) Resistance to impersonation attacks: Since authentic certificates are employed to achieve entity authentication, impersonation attacks are hard to launch as the attacker has to forge the TA's signature in order to forge a certificate, which is cryptographically infeasible in PKI.
3) Forward secrecy: Since the values of the hash chain included in the revocation messages are released to unrevoked OBUs starting from the last value of the hash chain, and given the fact that a hash function is irreversible, a revoked OBU cannot use a hash chain value v j−ver+1 received in a previous revocation process to get the current hash chain value v j−ver . Consequently, a revoked OBU cannot update its key set. In addition, a revoked OBU can get neither v j−ver necessary to update its key set nor K g from the neighboring OBUs since the revoked OBUs' certificates are in the up-to-date CRL which prevents unrevoked OBUs from forwarding v j−ver ||K g to the revoked OBUs. Accordingly, ESPR guarantees forward secrecy.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed ESPR in terms of the incurred communications overhead, cryptography delay, and average end-to-end delay.
A. Communications Overhead
We are interested in the multi-hop communications overhead incurred due to securing the routing process. In the hybrid scheme, the communications overhead in each packet consists of a source node certificate, signature of the source node, certificate of a forwarder, and signature of the forwarder on the mutable fields. In the ESPR scheme, the communications overhead in each packet consists of a source node certificate, signature of the source node, and an HMAC calculated by a forwarder on the routing header. It should be noted that in the ESPR scheme there is no need to insert any certificates for the intermediate node as the nexthop needs only K g to verify HMAC. We consider Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [12] , which is the method adopted in the VANET IEEE1609.2 standard, as the employed signature scheme. In ECDSA, each signature consists of two elliptic curve points. We consider ECDSA implemented on an MNT curve [13] , where an elliptic curve point is represented by 160 bits. Moreover, a certificate in IEEE1609.2 standard is 125 bytes. We also consider Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) [14] as the employed HMAC function, where the size of the output hash is 160 bits. Consequently, the communications overhead incurred due to securing the routing process in the hybrid scheme and ESPR is 330 bytes and 185 bytes, respectively. Accordingly, the ESPR scheme decreases the incurred communications overhead by 43.9% compared to the hybrid scheme.
B. Cryptography Delay
We are interested in the cryptography delay T crypt which is defined as the incurred delay due to the performed cryptography operations for securing the routing process. Let T mul and T hash denote the time required to perform one point multiplication on an elliptic curve and HMAC, respectively. In ECDSA, a certificate verification, signature generation, and signature verification takes 2T mul , T mul , and 2T mul , respectively. In the hybrid scheme, the source has to generate two signatures on the mutable and immutable fields, respectively, which takes 2T mul . Moreover, each subsequent node along the route has to verify the certificates and 978-1-4244-5638-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 Crown the signatures of both the source and previous forwarder which takes 8T mul . In addition, each intermediate node has to sign the mutable field after updating it which takes T mul . Consequently, T crypt for the hybrid scheme is (10 + 9n)T mul , where n is the number of intermediate nodes.
In the ESPR scheme, the source has to sign the message which takes T mul , and calculate HMAC on the routing header which takes T hash . In addition, each subsequent node in the route has to verify the certificate and the signature of the source node, verify the received HMAC, insert the data for the next hop, and calculate HMAC on the new data. Consequently, T crypt for the hybrid scheme is (5 + 4n)T mul + 2(n + 1)T hash .
In [15] , T mul is found for an MNT curve, with order of 160 bits and embedding degree k = 6, to be equal to 0.6 msec. We adopt the Crypto++ library [16] for calculating T hash , where it is compiled on Intel Core2Duo 2 GHz machine. T hash for SHA-1 is 0.21 μsec. Fig. 4 shows the cryptography delay in msec vs. the number of intermediate nodes. It can be seen that the ESPR scheme significantly decreases the cryptography delay compared to that of the hybrid scheme. For example, when the number of intermediate nodes is 5, the ESPR decreases the cryptography delay by more than 50% compared to that of the hybrid scheme.
C. Average End-to-End Delay
In this section, we study the average end-to-end delay by conducting NS-2 [17] simulation for Manhattan city-street scenario, where the simulated area is 7.4 Km × 7.4 Km, the simulation time is 30 sec, the number of vehicles is 3839 vehicles, and the maximum vehicle speed is 60 Km/h. We adopt the Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) scheme [18] as an instance of the PBR schemes. In GPSR, the default packet forwarding strategy is the greedy strategy, where the sender selects the closest vehicle to the destination as the next hop. If the sender cannot find a forwarder based on the greedy strategy, it forwards the packet around the perimeter of the region containing itself and the destination. In the conducted simulation, we consider the hybrid scheme and the ESPR scheme for securing the GPSR scheme. In addition, we consider 10 constant bit-rate (CBR) sources send packets of size 500 bytes every 150 msec to arbitrary sink nodes. Fig. 5 shows the average end-to-end delay per packet in msec vs. the number of hops for GPSR, GPSR-ESPR, and GPSR-hybrid, respectively. It can be seen from Fig. 5 that GPSR introduces the smallest average end-to-end delay as it does not include any security processes. When security schemes are employed, ESPR introduces a smaller average end-to-end delay than hybrid scheme. Consequently, employing ESPR meets the hard time constraint of some VANETs applications, e.g., safety applications, beside providing the required security for PBR protocols.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed an efficient security scheme for positionbased routing (ESPR) in VANETs. The proposed ESPR employs digital signature and HMAC to achieve secure operation between end-to-end and intermediate nodes. ESPR features low communication overhead and small end-to-end delay compared to the hybrid scheme. Our future work will consider developing crosslayer security scheme for VANETs.
